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This paper proposes a dialogue game in
which coherent conversational sequences
at the speech act level are described of
agents that become aware they have a
disagreement and settle the dispute by
agreeing to disagree when they believe
insufficient propositions to resolve the
situation. A dialogue game is formu-
lated in which agents can offer informa-
tion possibly resulting in non-reconcilable,
mutually inconsistent belief states. These
states are handled by a dialogue rule that
defines when to ‘agree to disagree’.
1 Introduction
If we are to understand conversations we may need
to carefully model the underlying principles that
drive them, but we would probably be just as sat-
isfied if we could build computational models that
generate useful conversations. In general con-
versations, participants may have autonomy over
their cognitive states but they may also have in-
tentions to change those of others. This autonomy
and intention may result in discussions about non-
reconcilable beliefs. How to cope with these dis-
putes and how to devise a computational model
that identifies them?
A dialogue game by Beun (2001) describes
speech acts between agents and identifies three
structures with accompanying properties that form
a dialogue game that agents need to play to com-
municate in a sensible way. Agents need to have a
cognitive state, dialogue rules to generate speech
acts to convey information to other agents and up-
date rules to process incoming information. In
Lebbink et al. (2003), a multi-valued logic is intro-
duced to describe inconsistent and biased inform-
ation in dialogue games without forcing agents
to perform belief revision. In the same vein as
the FIPA work on agent communication languages
(Labrou, 2001), we formulate semantics of the
speech acts to offer information and to agree to
disagree.
What is lacking in Beun (2001) and Lebbink et
al. (2003), is the possibility for agents to recog-
nize irresolvable disagreements and based on this
recognition utter an agreement to disagree making
the disagreement common belief. This common
belief can motivate dialogues on the definition of
the terms used in the disagreement or dialogues to
weaken arguments in order to retract propositions
to resolve the disagreement.
Agents may be motivated to persuade others
to accept to believe certain propositions. Con-
sequently, agents may accept to believe proposed
propositions, but they may also deny to accept to
believe propositions when accepting them would
result in inconsistent beliefs. The objective is
to present a dialogue game in which cognitive
agents become aware of non-reconcilable beliefs
and manifest this awareness to others while pre-
serving their private beliefs. We use a formal
method to represent classical and inconsistent in-
formation in the agents’ cognitive states, enabling
us to devise dialogue rules that can cope with these
types of information. The resulting formalism al-
lows for embedded dialogues and verification of
existing dialogues, but notably it is computational
which makes it possible to generate all valid dia-
logues in a dialogue game.
In the following (fictitious) dialogue, Tv (from
Sesame Street) tries to insure his new car; he rings
an insurance company and explains his desire to
an insurance agent (Ia). The Ia wants to sell Tv an
expensive insurance policy because Sesame Street
puppets are prone to fast and dangerous driving.
The Ia wants Tv to accept that its car is not safe
justifying an expensive policy. For the sake of
argument, agents do not accept information that
renders their beliefs inconsistent. This dialogue is
mathematically checked as a valid sequence of ut-
terances of our dialogue game. We omit proofs
and conclude that this dialogue is one of the 177
different valid dialogues.
Dialogue 1 (Car insurance in Sesame Street)
1. Tv to Ia ‘My car is a Ferrari.’
2. Ia to Tv ‘Ok.’
3. Tv to Ia ‘(and) My car is safe.’
4. Ia to Tv ‘I don’t believe that.’
5. Ia to Tv ‘(actually) I think your car is not safe.’
6. Tv to Ia ‘I don’t accept that my car is not safe.’
7. Ia to Tv ‘Do you accept that if a car is a
Ferrari then it is not a safe car?’
8. Tv to Ia ‘(no) I don’t want to accept that.’
9. Ia to Tv ‘Lets agree to disagree whether your
car is safe or not.’
10. Tv to Ia ‘Ok.’
2 A Dialogue Game to Offer Information
In accordance with Wittgenstein’s dictum “mean-
ing is use”, we propose a dialogue game that gives
meaning to the conception of offering information.
To understand a word or sentence is to know how
to use it. And to be able to use a word or a sen-
tence is to be capable of recognizing the contexts
in which it is appropriate to utter it (Ellenbogen,
2003). This activity of speaking is described in
a normative way, governed by dialogue rules that
dictate correct and incorrect use of communicat-
ive acts. We could say that an agent understands a
word when it can distinguish between correct and
incorrect uses.
Following the approach taken in Beun (2001)
and Lebbink et al. (2003), a dialogue game is a
set of dialogue rules that describe which commu-
nicative acts an agent may utter given its current
cognitive state. A dialogue game also has a set of
update rules that describe the changes of the cog-
nitive state given an uttered communicative act.
We assume that information can only accumu-
late in the participants’ cognitive states and can-
not be retracted. In this information-monotonic
approach additions may introduce inconsistent be-
liefs. Although the dialogue rules we are to
present will prohibit inconsistencies, agents use
the possibility of inconsistencies in a look-ahead
fashion when deciding to believe propositions.
Agents are considered omnipotent and use equal
consequence relations. In addition, agents can
only speak to one agent at a time via an ideal
half-duplex communication channel which means
that no information is lost and that information can
only flow in one direction at a time. No restrictions
are made on the number of participants.
2.1 Ordering of Information: Bilattices
Whereas in classical logic terms are assigned a
truth-value true or false, in multi-valued logic
(MVL) new truth-values are introduced to rep-
resent uncertain, non-determined or other epi-
stemic attitudes (Rescher, 1969). In previous work
(Lebbink et al., 2003), truth-values from a bilat-
tice structure (Ginsberg, 1988; Fitting, 1991) are
used to define a MVL, and theories of this MVL
are used to represent the agent’s cognitive state.
Theories of MVL are sets of multi-valued propos-
itions which are terms taken from some ontology
with an assigned truth-value from a bilattice struc-
ture. Next to these propositions, an implication
operation for four truth-values imp4 is added with
a reading similar to the one from classical logic: if
the antecedent of the implication is part of a the-
ory, then the consequent is also present.
Two terms are used to denote the information
of the example dialogue: is a(this car, ferrari)
and is a(this car, safe) stating that it is true that
this car denoted by this car is a Ferrari and a
safe one respectively. The multi-valued pro-
position is a(this car, ferrari):f is read as ‘term
is a(this car, ferrari) has truth-value f’. If this pro-
position is part of a theory T that represents the
beliefs of some agent, we say that the agent be-
lieves that ‘this car is not a Ferrari’. An implica-
tion between the fact that if some car is a Ferrari
then that car is not safe, is represented by the pro-
position imp4(is a(X, ferrari):t, is a(X, safe):f):t.





















Figure 1: Bilattice representing partial and incon-
sistent information.
izes an intuitive space of generalized truth-values
with two lattice orderings. In Figure 1 the bilat-
tice for a four-valued logic (Belnap Jr., 1977) is
graphically depicted; t and f stand for the clas-
sical truth-values true and false respectively; non-
orthodox truth-value u and i represent a complete
lack of information (unknown) and the inconsist-
ent information state. Truth-values are ordered by
the amount of truth ≤t and the amount of inform-
ation≤k; only the latter is of interest to us. For in-
stance, u has less information than t and f, denoted
by u ≤k t and u ≤k f, but t and f are unrelated to
one another in the k-order, that is, t k f and f
k t. Bilattices with more truth-values and even
a continuum of truth-values can be used to repres-
ent biased information or probabilities (Ginsberg,
1988); we use only the four from Figure 1.
2.2 Communicative Acts
The communicative act of offering information
and its two corresponding answers to accept and
reject information are defined next. The act of an
offer [x, y, p]! is uttered by a speaker (x) directed
to a listener (y) and is read as ‘Are you (y) will-
ing to accept to believe proposition p?’ In the first
line of the example dialogue, Tv states that its car
is a Ferrari, which we consider equal to the phrase
‘Are you, Ia, willing to accept to believe that it is
true that my car is a Ferrari?’. In answer to this,
in the second line, the Ia grants Tv’s offer. The act
of granting an offer [x, y, p]!+ is read as ‘I (x) am
willing to accept to believe p.’ An agent may also
deny an offer, which is done in line four when the
Ia denies to believe that Tv’s car is safe. The act of
denying an offer [x, y, p]!− is read as ‘I (x) am not
willing to accept to believe p.’ The act of agreeing
to disagree [x, y, (p, q)]∆ is read as ‘Are you (y)
willing to agree that we are in disagreement over
proposition p and q.’ Precise contexts for correct
use of these acts are defined in Section 2.6.
A rendition of the dialogue from Section 1 is
used in the remainder of this paper.
Dialogue 2 (Car insurance in Sesame Street)
1. [tv, ia, is a(this car, ferrari):t]!
2. [ia, tv, is a(this car, ferrari):t]!+
3. [tv, ia, is a(this car, safe):t]!
4. [ia, tv, is a(this car, safe):t]!−
5. [ia, tv, is a(this car, safe):f]!
6. [tv, ia, is a(this car, safe):f]!−
7. [ia, tv, imp(is a(X, ferrari):t, is a(X, safe):f):t]!
8. [tv, ia, imp(is a(X, ferrari):t, is a(X, safe):f):t]!−
9. [ia, tv, (is a(this car, safe):f, is a(this car, safe):t)]∆
10. [tv, ia, (is a(this car, safe):f, is a(this car, safe):t)]∆
2.3 The Agent’s Cognitive State
An agent’s cognitive state consists of a number of
mental constructs which are theories of MVL. An
agent’s belief state is probably the most important
construct next to its desire state. A proposition p
is said to be believed by an agent x if p is part of
mental construct Bx, that is, p ∈ Bx. Analog-
ously, an agent x desires that an agent y believes a
proposition p if p is part of mental construct DByx ,
that is, p ∈ DByx . For example, Tv desires that the
Ia believes that it is true that this car is safe, that
is, is a(this car, safe):t∈ DBiatv .
Agents keep record of all other agents’ expli-
citly communicated beliefs, desires and accom-
panying consequences. The mental construct for
manifested beliefs MxBy represents agent y’s be-
liefs that agent x is aware of. For instance, ψ:t ∈
MxBy states that x is aware that y believes that
ψ has at least truth-value t. An agent also records
other agents’ communicated desires, this is done
in MxDBzy . For instance, Tv is aware that the Ia
desires that Tv believes that this car is not safe, that
is, is a(this car, safe):f∈ MtvDBtvia . Also, agents
need to keep record of explicitly stated ignorance
of other agents; the third type of mental construct
is the manifested ignorance state. p ∈ BxIy states
that agent x is aware that agent y is ignorant to-
wards p.
In addition, higher-order manifested mental
constructs are needed for agents to remember to
whom they stated their desires and beliefs. This
information is needed to prevent them from utter-
ing offers more than once; this is addressed by dia-
logue rules (Section 2.6). Mind-bending mental
constructs are needed to encode this information;
the construct MxMyBx states that x is aware of
y’s awareness that x believes p. From a usage per-
spective, if an agent has answered an offer regard-
ing some proposition then this proposition is part
of this construct; this is addressed by update rules
(Section 2.7). Likewise, if an agent has proposed
an agreement to disagree it is not allowed to ut-
ter the same agreement again. Therefore, a record
needs to be kept of these agreements. For instance,
MtvMia∆(tv, ia) states that Tv is aware of the Ia’s
awareness of their disagreement, this situation is
described in Section 3.2.
A dialogue game defines a space of different
dialogues that unfold by applying dialogue rules
and update rules. Given a (initial) cognitive state
of all agents participating in the dialogue (here-
after collective state), all sequences of commu-
nicative acts can be generated that are considered
valid in the game. For our example dialogue the
following initial collective state is used. The Ia has
the desire that Tv believes its car is not safe, and
Tv has the desire that the Ia believes that its car is
a Ferrari and safe. The Ia believes that if a car is
a Ferrari then the car is not safe, and Tv believes
that its car is a Ferrari and a safe one. Formally,
is a(this car, safe):f ∈ DBtvia ,
is a(this car, ferrari):t ∈ DBiatv ∩Btv,
imp4(is a(X, ferrari):t, is a(X, safe):f):t ∈ Bia, and
is a(this car, safe):t ∈ DBiatv ∩Btv.
2.4 Cognitive Processes
In our formalism, agents can perform two cog-
nitive processes: deciding to believe offered in-
formation and deducing consequences of newly
accepted beliefs. Other central concepts, such as
choice between permissible communicative acts,
or which strategy to use to persuade others, will
not be included in the descriptions presented here.
From a mathematical perspective, an agent is
persuaded to believe a proposition when its cog-
nitive state changes from not believing the propos-
ition to believing it (Walton and Krabbe, 1995);
the proposition is set-theoretically added to the be-
lief state. Agents can have different criteria for ac-
cepting to believe something. For simplicity, we
assume agents to be very credulous: they accept
to believe offered propositions that are consistent
with their current beliefs.
Reasoning is restricted to the agents’ ca-
pacity to draw conclusions based on be-
lieved implication rules and antecedents. If
an implication rule is believed by the Ia,
imp4(is a(X, ferrari):t, is a(X, safe):f):t ∈ Bx and
the Ia is persuaded to believe an antecedent that
the car is a Ferrari, is a(this car, ferrari):t ∈ Bia,
then it also concludes to believe the consequent
that the car is not safe, is a(this car, safe):f ∈ Bia.
However, if the Ia already believes
is a(this car, safe):t, then its belief state becomes
inconsistent, that is, is a(this car, safe):i ∈ Bia.
The closure cl(Bia ∪ {p}) corresponds with the
set of propositions including Ia’s beliefs plus p
with consequents.
2.5 Motivations to Communicate
In Beun (2001) an agent’s motivation to utter a
question is to balance its belief and desire state.
Stated in our terminology, an agent may pose a
question regarding some proposition if it has the
desire to be in a belief state in which it believes
the proposition and it currently does not (yet) be-
lieve the proposition. We give a similar motivation
to offer information. An agent xmay offer inform-
ation to an agent y regarding some proposition p if
x has the desire that y is to believe the proposition,
and x is not aware that y already believes the pro-
position. Stated differently, an agent’s motivation
to utter an offer is to balance its desire and mani-
fested belief state; an agent x is motivated to offer
p to y if p ∈ DByx and p 6∈MxBy.
According to the Gricean maxims of co-
operation, speakers are forbidden to ask anything
they already believe (Grice, 1975). Analogously,
speakers are forbidden to put forward informa-
tion if they are aware the listener already believes
the information. Next to giving restrictions, these
maxims also provide motivations for granting and
denying questions and offers: both should always
be answered. In the next paragraph, the motiv-
ations and restrictions are combined to form the
preconditions for ‘correct’ usage of our commu-
nicative acts; these preconditions provide the se-
mantics of the acts and give communicative acts
meaning in the context of a dialogue game.
2.6 Dialogue Rules
In group decisions, different experts make de-
cisions as a group by agreeing on the assumptions
they need to make to come to one common de-
cision. This means that the assumptions (which
are beliefs) should be non-conflicting. A motiv-
ation for someone who facilitates group decision
making is to introduce dialogue rules that enable
experts to offer information with the objective that
experts become aware of other agent’s attitudes to-
wards their beliefs. One way to check whether as-
sumptions are conflicting is to offer these to others
and conclude from their responses whether they
agree to believe these. In this section, the dialogue
rules are defined allowing an agent to utter com-
municative acts given its cognitive state.
An offer [x, y, p]! is defined applicable when the
speaker (x) is motivated to utter an offer. As stated
before, the speaker desires the listener (y) to be-
lieve proposition p and the speaker is not aware
that the listener already believes p, that is, p ∈
D
By
x and p 6∈ MxBy. Of course, a dialogue game
can be conceived in which meaning is given to of-
fering information even when the speaker is aware
the listener already believes this. Such a different
game is played when the speaker wants to convey
that it was not aware that the listener believed the
proposition, although it was. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that in this dialogue game, agents are not
allowed to propose information that they do not
believe themselves. Due to the ideal communica-
tion channel, agents are also not allowed to pose a
communicative act more than once: after uttering
an offer, they are aware that the listener is aware
of the speaker’s desire to induce a belief change.
This is represented by the mental construct that
the speaker is aware that the listener is aware of
the speaker’s desire to induce a belief change as-
sociated with p in the listener. Also, proposition p
should not be part of this mental construct, that is,
p 6∈MxMyDByx which can only be true if speaker
has already offered p.
Definition 1 (offer) If p ∈ DByx , p 6∈ MxBy, p ∈
Bx and p 6∈ MxMyDByx then an offer [x, y, p]! is
applicable.
The communicative act of granting an of-
fer [x, y, p]!+ is applicable when the (granting)
speaker (x) believes the proposition p. Whether
agent x is persuaded to believe the proposition as a
result of the offer x is responding to, does not mat-
ter. Obviously, a speaker may only grant an offer
if it is aware the listener has the desire to make the
speaker believe p, that is, p ∈MxDBxy . In this dia-
logue game, an agent x can only be aware of this
if the other agent y has uttered an offer. To ensure
that the information represented by granting an of-
fer is not superfluous, e.g. stated more than once,
the speaker may not be aware that the listener is
aware that the speaker believes the proposition it
granted, that is, p 6∈MxMyBx.
Definition 2 (granting an offer) If p ∈ Bx, p ∈
MxD
Bx
y and p 6∈MxMyBx then granting an offer
[x, y, p]!+ is applicable.
An offer of information can be answered by
granting or denying to accept to believe the pro-
position. The act of denying an offer [x, y, p]!− is
similar to the act of granting with the difference
that the speaker had not been persuaded to believe
p, that is, p 6∈ Bx. Equal to the act of granting an
offer, the speaker must be aware that the listener
has the desire to induce a cognitive state change
in the speaker, that is, p ∈ MxDBxy . To prevent
that the denial is not superfluous, the speaker may
not be aware that the listener is already aware that
it has explicitly stated that it does not believe the
proposition, that is, p 6∈MxMyIx.
Definition 3 (denying an offer) If p 6∈ Bx, p ∈
MxD
Bx
y and p 6∈ MxMyIx then denying an offer
[x, y, p]!− is applicable.
A follow-up offer is an offer that substantiates
some claim to believe another proposition. This
offer is syntactically indistinguishable from the of-
fer defined in Definition 1. However, the follow-
up offer is a different speech act from a semantic
perspective: it has the following preconditions.
The speaker has the desire that the listener believes
some proposition p, but the listener does (not yet)
believe p and the speaker has already offered him
p. The speaker may utter a follow-up offer regard-
ing proposition q if q added to the listeners belief
state would make him accept to believe p. Form-
ally, if q is added set theoretically to MxBy, then
p becomes part of the manifested belief state, that
is, p ∈ cl(MxBy∪{q}). The proposition q may in
this case be offered when the listener does not be-
lieve it and the speaker has not proposed it before.
Definition 4 (follow-up offer) If p ∈ DByx , p 6∈
MxBy, p ∈ MxMyDByx , p ∈ cl(MxBy ∪ {q}),
q 6∈ MxBy and q 6∈ MxMyDByx then offer
[x, y, q]! is applicable.
2.7 Update Rules
Update rules define the agent’s change of cognit-
ive state given a communicative act directed at the
agent.
After a speaker (x) has offered proposition p
to a listener (y), that is, after [x, y, p]!, the fol-
lowing properties for the cognitive states hold.
The listener is aware that the speaker desires the
listener to believe proposition p, that is, p ∈
MyD
By
x , and the speaker is aware that the listener
is aware of this, that is, p ∈ MxMyDByx . In
addition, after an offer the listener is aware that
the speaker believes the proposition, that is, p ∈
MyBx, and the speaker is aware that the listener
is aware of this, p ∈ MxMyBx. Offering a pro-
position may have the effect that the listener is
persuaded to believe the proposition (p ∈ By).
Note that being persuaded is not encoded in up-
date rules but in the agent’s cognitive processes
(Section 2.4).
Definition 5 (offer) after the update of an offer
[x, y, p]! holds that p ∈MyDByx , p ∈MxMyDByx ,
p ∈MyBx and p ∈MxMyBx .
After a speaker (x) has granted an offer regard-
ing proposition p to a listener (y), that is [x, y, p]!+,
the following properties for the cognitive state
hold. The listener is aware the speaker believes
proposition p, that is, p ∈ MyBx, and the speaker
is aware that the listener is aware of this, that is,
p ∈ MxMyBx. Remember, this mental construct
is used to represent that the speaker has granted
the offer.
Definition 6 (granting an offer) after the update
of granting an offer [x, y, p]!+ holds that p ∈
MyBx and p ∈MxMyBx.
After a speaker (x) has denied an offer regard-
ing proposition p to a listener (y), that is [x, y, p]!−,
the following properties for the cognitive state
hold. Similar to granting an offer, after denying
an offer, the listener is aware that the speaker does
not believe the proposition, that is, it is ignorant
towards it, p ∈ MyIx. Also, the speaker is aware
of this, which is represented by p ∈MxMyIx.
Definition 7 (denying an offer) after the update
of denying an offer [x, y, p]!− holds that p ∈MyIx
and p ∈MxMyIx.
3 Agree to Disagree
If a group of experts are unable to agree on a
decision when for example two experts disagree
on some propositions that are needed to agree,
a persuasion dialogue may resolve the disagree-
ment by adding information to the expert’s belief
state (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). If all methods
to persuade have become exhausted, the experts
can conclude that they disagree on a specific sub-
ject and that they both agree on this. This agree-
ment may trigger the meta dialogue in which for
example a coin flipping method is proposed to re-
solve the problem. In this section, a dialogue rule
for agreeing to disagree is proposed, making the
disagreement common belief.
3.1 Disagreement
Two pieces of information are in disagreement
when they are not subsumed under each other
in the information order. Stated differently, two
pieces of information disagree when the truth-
values representing the information are not related
with respect to the information order ≤k. For ex-
ample, t disagrees with f because t k f and
f k t, but u agrees with t because u ≤k t.
An agent believing a proposition ψ : u and an-
other agent believing ψ : t do not disagree about
ψ, the latter agent is just more informed than the
former naive agent. Equally, t agrees with i be-
cause t ≤k i, see also Figure 1.
A disagreement between two agents x and y
about the truth-value of term ψ exists if (and only
if) x believes a proposition ψ : θ1 and y believes
proposition ψ : θ2, and the truth-values disagree.
In line 1 of the example dialogue, Tv states that
the car is a Ferrari. After the update of cognitive
states, the Ia believes this and he concludes that
this car is not a safe car, but he is not yet aware
that Tv believes that this car is safe.
3.2 Awareness of Disagreements
An agent (x) is aware of a disagreement with an-
other agent (y) if and only if x believes a proposi-
tion ψ:θ1 and x is aware that y believes proposition
ψ:θ2 and θ1 disagrees with θ2. In line 3 of the ex-
ample dialogue Tv states that its car is safe. After
the cognitive state update of this act the Ia is aware
that Tv believes that the car is safe; the Ia is now
aware of a disagreement because it believes that
the car is safe. After line 4, Tv is also aware of the
disagreement.
Under the assumption that the dialogue only
results in additions of the agents’ cognitive states,
it can be proven that disagreement awareness al-
ways implies the existence of a disagreement and
that it is not possible that agents are incorrectly
aware of a disagreement. Note that if agents have
a disagreement, they need not be aware of this.
A second-order disagreement awareness exists
when an agent (x) is aware that another agent (y)
believes a proposition ψ:θ1 and x is aware that y
is aware that x believes proposition ψ :θ2 and θ1
disagrees with θ2. In line 5 the Ia states that it be-
lieves that the car is not safe, after the update, the
Ia is aware of a second order disagreement. After
line 6, Tv is also aware of this disagreement.
3.3 Resolving Disagreements
The minimal piece of information that is needed to
resolve a disagreement between two agents about
a term ψ is represented by proposition ψ : ξ that
if added to one of the agent’s belief state re-
solves the disagreement. Remember that in the
current dialogue game only additions of inform-
ation are possible and consequently, resolving dis-
agreement can only take place by adding sufficient
information to one of the two agent’s, rendering it
possibly inconsistent.
3.4 Dialogue Rule to Agree to Disagree
The situation in which participants may utter an
agreement to disagree can now be equated in a dia-
logue rule. The speaker (x) may propose to agree
to disagree about term ψ to the listener (y) if:
1. The speaker is aware that it has a disagreement
about term ψ with the listener, that is, ψ:θ1 ∈ Bx,
ψ:θ2 ∈MxBy and θ1 disagrees with θ2.
2. The speaker is aware that the listener is also
aware of the disagreement, that is, ψ : θ3 ∈
MxMyBx and θ3 disagrees with θ2.
3. The speaker is not aware of a set of proposi-
tions that it has not offered to the listener before
that could have resolved the disagreement if the
listener had accepted to believe them. Suppose the
proposition ψ :ξ1 represents the minimal amount
of information that if added to the listener’s be-
lief state resolves the disagreement. If for a set
of propositions Φ that is believed by the speaker
(Φ ⊆ Bx) holds that if Φ were added to the
listener’s belief state then the disagreement would
have been resolved, that is, ψ:ξ1 ∈ cl(MxBy ∪Φ).
Furthermore, if a set of proposition Φ ⊆ Bx
has been offered to the listener then holds that
Φ ⊆ MxMyDByx . We can now state that the
speaker has no methods (sets of propositions Φ)
left to persuade the listener by (∀Φ ⊆ Bx)(ψ:ξ1 ∈
cl(MxBy ∪ Φ)⇒ Φ ⊆MxMyDByx ).
4. According to the speaker, the listener is not
aware of a set of proposition not offered to the
speaker before that can resolve the disagreement if
the speaker accepts to believe them. That is, for all
sets of propositions Ψ believed by the listener ac-
cording to the speaker (Ψ ⊆ MxBy) holds that if
these propositions Ψ were believed by the speaker
then the speaker would have believed ψ:ξ2 repres-
enting the minimal information that is needed to
resolve the disagreement (according to the listen-
ers that the speaker is aware of), that is, ψ :ξ2 ∈
cl(MxMyBx ∪ Ψ). If all these propositions Ψ
have been offered and apparently this did not re-
solve the disagreement, that is Ψ ⊆ MxMyIx,
the speaker is aware that the listener has no meth-
ods left to resolve the situation. Formally, (∀Ψ ⊆
MxBy)(ψ : ξ2 ∈ cl(MxMyBx ∪ Ψ) ⇒ Ψ ⊆
MxMyIx).
5. The speaker is not aware that it proposed
to agree to disagree regarding the disagreement
before. Agreements to disagree are kept re-
cord of similar to manifested beliefs and desires.
MxMy∆(x, y) states that x is aware of the agree-
ment to disagree by x between the agents.
If these five preconditions hold, the speaker may
propose an agreement to disagree regarding ψ, de-
noted [x, y, (ψ:θ3, ψ:θ2)]∆.
3.5 Generation of the Example Dialogue
The proposed dialogue game gives preconditions
to offer information. Combined with the formal
rule of the speech acts, the update rules and the
(not presented) axioms of theories of MVL, the
example dialogue can be proven to follow from
the initial collective state. Note that the agree-
ment to disagree is based on information regard-
ing the two agents involved in the disagreement.
This disagreement may need to be retracted when
new information is gained on how to resolve the
situation. This is because the agreement is based
on the absence of beliefs of only the two agents
that actually have the disagreement. If another
agent offers a proposition that resolves the dis-
agreement, the agreement to disagree needs to be
retracted.
With the help of software tools, the complete
state space of the dialogue game with its ini-
tial collective state is generated in one tenth of a
second, resulting in a graph with 37 nodes rep-
resenting the collective states and with 66 edges
representing speech act utterances with associated
cognitive state updates. This network comprises
177 different dialogues with three different final
collective states. One has to remember that an
agent accepts to believe a proposition if it is con-
sistent with its current belief state. This makes of-
fering information of crucial importance, resulting
in the three different endings.
4 Conclusions
We have given a formal semantics to the act of
uttering a proposal to agree to disagree; these
semantics are defined by formulating the rules
of usage in the context of a computational dia-
logue game for offering information. We have
shown that semantics of communicative acts can
be given with a dialogue game in an intuitive man-
ner, and that given the dialogue game a formal sys-
tem emerges in which sequences of communicat-
ive acts can be checked valid dialogues. Also dia-
logues can be generated from the dialogues and
update rules providing the possibility to analyse
dialogue games on useful properties like termina-
tion or whether the unbalanced desire/belief states
are resolved in the terminating collective states.
If two agents utter their agreement to disagree
they are mutually aware of the disagreement they
have about some proposition, this awareness is
vital in group decisions because these decisions
should not be based on information that agents dis-
agree upon. Once agents agree to disagree about a
proposition it cannot be used in future reasoning,
even previous decisions in which this proposition
played a role may be compromised.
Future research addresses agents that strategic-
ally select which speech acts to utter with the in-
tention to arrive at a collective state in which de-
sirable properties hold. Other research centres
around speech acts for retracting information. Re-
tracting information is an act of offering not to
believe a proposition, that is, an offering to for-
get. Retractions of information enhance the cur-
rent dialogue game by to retracting agreements to
disagree when new information comes to light.
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